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ABSTRACT 
  More than seventeen years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the United States continues to battle terrorist organizations inspired by 
or derived from al Qaeda under the legal aegis of the 2001 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force. The government has 
interpreted this law as providing expansive authority to conduct 
military operations against actors that did not even exist in 2001, 
including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”). Congress has 
largely supported this effort in annual authorizing legislation and by 
funding the campaign against ISIS. 
  Despite this permissive legal environment, the government pressed 
for even greater flexibility in Smith v. Obama, a 2016 challenge to the 
legal basis for the anti-ISIS campaign, arguing that the war powers are 
subject to the political question doctrine and thus outside the purview 
of the courts. The district court accepted this argument, contravening 
recent Supreme Court decisions that narrow the doctrine’s scope. In 
doing so, the Smith court cast doubt on the primacy of Congress in 
bringing the United States into war. 
  In response, this Note offers three insights. First, it assesses historical 
decisions in cases implicating executive branch war powers in light of 
the modern political question doctrine. Second, it critiques the Smith 
court’s failure to squarely confront the separation of powers questions 
presented by the case. Finally, it offers a series of recommendations for 
Congress and the courts to avoid the pitfalls of the political question 
doctrine in similar cases in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the Constitution’s explicit directive that Congress, not the 
President, has the power to declare war,1 post–World War II practices 
have undermined this seemingly clear rule. This trend originated 
during the Vietnam War as lower federal courts—which had previously 
interpreted the Constitution to allow judicial review of military action 
abroad—began to turn to justiciability, and especially the political 
question doctrine, to avoid difficult line-drawing questions.2  
The political question doctrine precludes courts from reviewing 
the wisdom of discretionary decisions reached by political actors, and 
properly so. However, it does not prevent a court from determining 
whether the official who has taken a challenged action had the legal 
authority to act. That understanding of the political question doctrine, 
taken to its logical extreme, significantly expands executive power at 
the expense of Congress. Such an interpretation would allow 
Presidents to rely on vague statutory grounds or the Commander in 
Chief Clause3—rather than on congressional authorization—to initiate 
and execute offensive military action abroad.4 Finally, aggressive 
interpretation and utilization of the political question doctrine could 
have unintended consequences in future cases; for example, an 
American citizen captured abroad while fighting with a terrorist 
organization could be precluded from challenging the legal basis for his 
detention.5 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have power . . . to declare war . . . .”). 
 2. See Stephen I. Vladeck, War and Justiciability, 49 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 47, 47 (2016) 
(noting that federal courts regularly heard challenges to military action before the Vietnam War). 
See generally Rodric B. Schoen, A Strange Silence: Vietnam and the Supreme Court, 33 
WASHBURN L.J. 275 (1994) (surveying federal court decisions that dismissed challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Vietnam War). 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States . . . .”). 
 4. There is some precedential support for the proposition that the President could respond 
to a military invasion or insurrection without waiting for Congress. See infra notes 128–31 (finding 
inherent Article II authority to take military action where a hostile power made war upon the 
United States). Further, while this Note does not address this question in detail, this would seem 
to be true as a logical and practical matter. 
 5. Cf. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (enjoining the government from 
transferring an American captured while fighting alongside ISIS to a third country because the 
Government had neither established that it had a legal basis for the campaign against ISIS nor 
that it had a factual basis for the claim that the detainee was, in fact, a member of ISIS). In theory, 
at least, Doe’s habeas petition would be complicated by a holding that the scope of the 2001 
AUMF as applied to ISIS is nonjusticiable. While Doe was eventually transferred to an unnamed 
third country, it is possible, and even likely, that similar situations could arise in the future. See 
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The possible reach of the political question doctrine is illustrated 
by the debate whether the President has the legal authority to 
prosecute a campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(“ISIS”)6 based on the legal authorities enacted in the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress quickly 
passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“2001 AUMF”),7 
which authorizes the President “to use all necessary and appropriate 
force” to prevent future terrorist attacks against the United States and 
to bring the perpetrators to justice.8 The following year, Congress 
authorized the invasion of Iraq in a second resolution, the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 
2002 (“2002 AUMF”).9 By mid-2014, following the rise of the terrorist 
group ISIS, the Obama administration had expanded the military 
campaign under these authorities to target this new threat in Syria and 
elsewhere.10  
These events ultimately gave rise to a case—Smith v. Obama,11 
discussed at length in this Note—challenging the constitutionality of 
the ISIS campaign. In Smith, a district court relied on lack of standing 
and on the political question doctrine to avoid determining whether 
Congress had authorized military action against ISIS.12 The D.C. 
 
Doe v. Mattis – Challenge to Detention of American by U.S. Military Abroad, ACLU (Oct. 29, 
2018), https://www.aclu.org/cases/doe-v-mattis-challenge-detention-american-us-military-abroad 
[https://perma.cc/5MVA-F77E] (discussing the case). 
 6. Observers have coined a number of names for ISIS, including ISIL and Daiish. See Ray 
Sanchez, ISIL, ISIS, or the Islamic State?, CNN (Oct. 25, 2014, 1:30 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/world/meast/isis-isil-islamic-state/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4HYN-D82D] (citing the multiplicity of names used by governments, media outlets, and others 
to denominate ISIS). For the sake of consistency, this Note refers to the organization as ISIS 
unless quoting a source that uses a different term. 
 7. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
[hereinafter 2001 AUMF]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 AUMF]. 
 10. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY 
FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED 
NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 15–17 (2016) [hereinafter DEC. 2016 MEMORANDUM]; see 
also Charlie Savage, White House Invites Congress to Approve ISIS Strikes, but Says It Isn’t 
Necessary, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/middleeast/
white-house-invites-congress-to-approve-isis-strikes-but-says-it-isnt-necessary.html [https:// 
perma.cc/D7MT-RY2Z]. 
 11. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal dismissed as 
moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 12. See id. at 304 (dismissing the case for lack of standing and for presenting a political 
question). 
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Circuit dismissed the case as moot but did not address the district 
court’s application of the political question doctrine.13 The district 
court’s reasoning, which was not repudiated by the appellate court, 
represents not only a significant and dangerous expansion of the 
political question doctrine but also a departure from previously 
established norms regarding the authority of courts to examine the 
legal justifications underlying the use of force abroad.14 
This Note examines the origin and development of the political 
question doctrine and its relationship to questions implicating the war 
powers. It argues that the Smith court misread the Supreme Court’s 
seminal decision in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton 
(“Zivotofsky I”)15 and that the Smith approach, if widely adopted, 
would improperly expand the political question doctrine. The doctrine, 
as formulated by the line of Supreme Court cases culminating in the 
two Zivotofsky decisions, protects a significant degree of discretion for 
the President and his subordinates in foreign policy and military affairs. 
However, an expanded political question doctrine, like that articulated 
by the Smith court, would preclude Congress from exercising 
meaningful oversight of the initiation of the use of military force. That 
congressional oversight is a critical constitutional constraint on 
presidential power.  
The Note proceeds as follows. Part I briefly surveys the facts 
surrounding the ongoing military campaign against ISIS that are 
relevant to Smith v. Obama. Part II examines the development of the 
political question doctrine, with an emphasis on its application to 
questions of foreign policy and military campaigns. Part III analyzes 
the constitutional and statutory authorities and constraints at issue in 
this context. Part IV assesses the district court’s decision in Smith in 
detail as a lens through which to examine the political question 
doctrine more broadly. Finally, Part V recommends several concrete 
steps to Congress and the courts to reduce the scope of the political 
question doctrine in this area. These recommendations include more 
faithful adherence by lower courts to the Supreme Court’s restricted 
reading of the political question doctrine in Zivotofsky I; more 
 
 13. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x at 10.  
 14. See Michael J. Glennon, Smith v. Obama: The Political Question Doctrine Misapplied, 
JUST SECURITY (Nov. 22, 2016, 1:04 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/34803/smith-v-obama-
political-question-doctrine-misapplied [https://perma.cc/497A-3FEW] (arguing that the Smith 
court misinterpreted the political question doctrine and characterizing the court as “straining to 
avoid” the question whether there was a dispute between Congress and the executive). 
 15. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012) (Zivotofsky I). 
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stringent application of standing jurisprudence to avoid reaching the 
political question doctrine; and a reinvigoration of the War Powers 
Resolution (“WPR”) that would require Congress to provide a clear 
statement before courts will find statutory authorization for a 
challenged military action. 
I.  THE ISIS CAMPAIGN AND SMITH’S LAWSUIT 
A. The Emergence of ISIS 
The terrorist group ISIS emerged following the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq in 2003.16 After the invasion, al Qaeda in Iraq (“AQI”), composed 
primarily of Sunnis, played a central role in the sectarian violence that 
gripped the country, exacerbating the conflict by targeting Shia 
civilians, government forces, and cultural landmarks.17 U.S. forces 
fought against AQI until withdrawing from Iraq in 2011.18 ISIS 
emerged from the remnants of AQI following the U.S. withdrawal, 
rapidly gaining strength in the Sunni-majority, western parts of Iraq.19  
The Syrian civil war also contributed to the rise of ISIS.20 The war 
began with a series of initially peaceful demonstrations against 
President Bashar al-Assad in 2010, contemporaneous with the “Arab 
Spring” protests across the region.21 However, Syrian security forces 
violently suppressed these protests.22 By mid-2012, Syria had fractured 
along largely sectarian lines, with the Shia-dominated regime in the 
west, Kurdish separatists in the north, and Sunni groups like ISIS in the 
east.23 After another year of bloody fighting, ISIS forces established 
 
 16. Stephen Preston, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., The Legal Framework for the 
United States’ Use of Military Force Since 9/11, Address Before the American Society of 
International Law (Apr. 10, 2015). 
 17. See Michael Crowley, How the Fate of One Holy Site Could Plunge Iraq Back into Civil 
War, TIME (June 26, 2014), http://time.com/2920692/iraq-isis-samarra-al-askari-mosque/ 
[https://perma.cc/SG6R-U67N] (describing ISIS’s targeting of civilians in Iraq).  
 18. Id. 
 19. David Ignatius, How ISIS Spread in the Middle East and How to Stop It, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
29, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syria-
iraq/412042/ [https://perma.cc/S3ZJ-6683]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. The Syrian regime depends primarily on support from the Shia and Alawites, the 
latter of which is a sect associated with Shia Islam. See Sam Dagher, The Families Who Sacrificed 
Everything for Assad, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2018/04/assad-alawite-syria/557810/ [https://perma.cc/K83Q-J9ZQ] (explaining that these 
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their capital in Raqqa in central Syria; from there, ISIS oversaw a 
“caliphate” that governed over ten million people in Syria and Iraq.24 
B. Operation Inherent Resolve 
President Barack Obama ordered U.S. military forces to return to 
Iraq in June 2014 to counter the threat posed by ISIS.25 President 
Obama stated that he took the action “pursuant to [his] constitutional 
authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief 
and Chief Executive.”26 He characterized the action as consistent with 
the WPR27 but cited no statutory basis for the campaign.28 He 
announced an offensive against ISIS in September 201429 that was later 
designated Operation Inherent Resolve (“OIR”).30 In an address to the 
nation, President Obama stated that the government had sufficient 
authority to prosecute the war against ISIS under both his Article II 
authority and the 2001 AUMF.31 American troops were engaged in 
offensive actions against ISIS when allied Iraqi troops captured the 
Mosul Dam in August 2014 with U.S. air support.32  
Obama administration officials subsequently cited both the 2001 
and 2002 AUMFs as establishing legal authority for military action 
 
groups hold key government positions in Assad’s government and provide many of the fighting 
forces defending his regime). 
 24. Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034 [https://perma.cc/HT6M-MKBY]. 
 25. See Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (June 26, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/26/letter-president-war-powers-
resolution-letter-regarding-iraq [https://perma.cc/PH8B-H8P7] (describing the scope and goals of 
the deployment of U.S. forces to Iraq). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on United States Strategy To Combat 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Terrorist Organization (Sept. 10, 2014) 
[hereinafter Sept. 2014 Presidential Address], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-
201400654/pdf/DCPD-201400654.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWG8-6K48]. 
 30. See Exec. Order No. 13,723, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,017 (Mar. 30, 2014) (establishing the 
Operation Inherent Resolve Campaign Medal). 
 31. Sept. 2014 Presidential Address, supra note 29; Savage, supra note 10.  
 32. See Azam Ahmed, In Retaking Iraqi Dam, Evidence of American Impact, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/world/middleeast/in-retaking-of-iraqi-dam-
evidence-of-american-impact.html [https://perma.cc/3ZHH-5NDS] (describing the role of 
American airstrikes in Iraqi military efforts to retake the Mosul Dam from ISIS). 
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against ISIS.33 In short, the argument proceeded as follows: the 2001 
AUMF provides authorization for OIR because ISIS was derived from, 
or is an associated force of, al Qaeda;34 further, the 2002 AUMF 
explicitly authorizes military action to address any threat “emanating 
from” Iraq and implicitly grants authority to stabilize Iraq against 
military threats following the conclusion of the 2003 campaign. 
President Donald Trump’s administration indicated in a letter to 
Senator Bob Corker, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, that legal authority for the campaign “includes the 2001 
Authorization for Use of Military Force.”35 The Trump administration 
reiterated that position in testimony given by Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.36  
C. Smith v. Obama 
Captain Nathan Smith filed suit against President Obama on May 
4, 2016,37 after he was deployed to Kuwait in support of the anti-ISIS 
campaign.38 He asked the court to find that President Obama lacked 
legal authority to pursue military action against ISIS, that the campaign 
constituted an undeclared war, and that it therefore infringed on 
Congress’s constitutional authority.39 Smith personally supported the 
military campaign, and stated that he had filed the lawsuit solely to 
compel the President and Congress to fulfill their obligations under the 
Constitution.40 Smith was joined in his filings by various amici who 
 
 33. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 298 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal 
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (identifying the 
statutory basis relied on by the President as the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs); see also Jeh Charles 
Johnson, National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama Administration—Dean’s 
Lecture at Yale Law School, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 141, 145–46 (2012) (describing the legal 
framework for targeting “associated forces” under the 2001 AUMF). For a more fulsome 
discussion of the two AUMFs and their implications, see infra notes 188–211 and accompanying 
text. 
 34. See Preston, supra note 16 (discussing both theories). 
 35. Letter from Charles Faulkner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Legis. Affairs, U.S. 
State Dep’t, to Senator Bob Corker (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015d-
a3bf-d43a-a3dd-b3bf14170000 [https://perma.cc/QR85-MJDM].  
 36. Rex Tillerson, Sec’y of State, Dep’t of State, Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on AUMF 1 (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/103017_Tillerson_Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR8H-ME4M]. 
 37. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(No. 16-843) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 38. Id. ¶ 1.  
 39. Id. ¶ 40. 
 40. Id. ¶¶ 5–7. 
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argued that the Obama administration’s overly broad interpretation of 
the 2001 AUMF and the Commander in Chief Clause had read all the 
meaning out of the War Powers Clause.41  
The Government moved to dismiss on three grounds.42 First, the 
Government asserted that the case presented a political question.43 The 
Government argued that the question of whether war had been 
declared was “‘textually committed’ for resolution to the political 
branches”44 and that courts lacked “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards” to decide the case.45 Second, the Government 
attacked Smith’s standing, arguing that he had suffered no cognizable 
injury.46 Third, the Government argued that Smith had failed to 
establish that the United States had waived sovereign immunity to 
allow the suit.47 In a subsequent filing, the Government offered an 
analysis of the 2001 AUMF, the 2002 AUMF, and other legislation to 
illustrate congressional support for OIR.48  
While the Government never conceded that the court had 
jurisdiction to reach the merits, the Government did present evidence 
showing that the campaign was congressionally authorized: under the 
2001 AUMF, the executive possesses authority to conduct 
counterterrorism operations “against persons who were a part of . . . 
associated forces”;49 the definition of associated forces includes persons 
“engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners”;50 the 2002 AUMF authorizes the use of force to address 
“terrorist threats emanating from Iraq”;51 and Congress funded and 
 
 41. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Want of 
Jurisdiction at 18–19, Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-843) (“For the 
Court to permit the President to make war on the basis of the specious authority he now claims 
would wholly defeat the purposes animating the constitutional division of war powers and 
Congress’s intent in enacting the War Powers Resolution.”). 
 42. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) 
at 2, Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-843) [hereinafter Reply].  
 43. Id. at 2. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 14. 
 47. Id. at 24.  
 48. See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 5–17, 
Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-843) [hereinafter Gov’t Mem. of Law] 
(citing subsequent congressional enactments authorizing and funding OIR). 
 49. Id. at 6. 
 50. Id. (quoting the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-81, § 1021(b), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011)). 
 51. Id. at 7. 
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authorized the campaign against ISIS in fiscal years 2015 and 2016.52 
Finally, the Government noted that the President had provided reports 
to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution.”53  
Unsurprisingly,54 the court dismissed Smith’s claims.55 It rejected 
each of his theories of injury to find that he had no standing.56 First, the 
court found Smith’s oath to “support and defend the Constitution”57 
would not require him to disobey an order to deploy that he thought 
might be illegal.58 Second, the fact that Smith believed that he had been 
forced to violate his oath of office was not a sufficiently concrete 
injury.59 Finally, the court noted that Smith had not alleged any 
“[p]hysical or [i]ndividual [l]iberty-[b]ased [i]njuries.”60 This Note does 
not address Smith’s standing but assumes arguendo that the court 
reached the correct result on the issue.61 
The court then addressed the Government’s political question 
claim and found that dismissal was appropriate on those grounds as 
well.62 The court found that the question whether the 2001 or the 2002 
AUMF authorizes military action against ISIS is inextricably bound 
with inherently political determinations of what is “necessary and 
appropriate” for carrying out the congressionally authorized 
 
 52. Id. at 10–15. 
 53. Id. at 14 (quoting Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, supra note 
25). 
 54. See Vladeck, supra note 2, at 47 (noting that federal courts rarely reach the merits in suits 
challenging the legality of the use of military force); Marty Lederman, DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss 
in Smith v. Obama, the Case Challenging the Legality of the War Against ISIL, JUST SECURITY 
(July 14, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/31984/dojs-motion-dismiss-smith-v-obama-case-
challenging-legality-war-isil/ [https://perma.cc/Q63U-39XH] (arguing that the Smith court should 
dismiss the case for lack of standing).  
 55. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 304 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal dismissed 
as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 56. Id. at 291–92 (finding that the plaintiff did not have a legal duty to disobey the orders to 
deploy); id. at 293–94 (finding that no injury—for the purposes of the standing inquiry—arose 
from the plaintiff’s violation of his own oath of office); id. at 296 (finding that no physical or 
liberty-based injuries resulted from the plaintiff’s deployment).  
 57. Id. at 293 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2012)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 293–94. 
 60. Id. at 296. 
 61. For a discussion of the role of other justiciability doctrines in deciding similar cases, see 
infra Part IV. 
 62. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 297. 
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campaign.63 The Smith court’s decision is consistent with judgments 
declining to enjoin a President from conducting an ongoing war.64 
However, previous cases—from the time of the Founding through the 
Vietnam War—reached the merits to find congressional authorization 
for military action.65 Smith’s expansive language describing the broad 
powers of the President in this arena, though, seems to suggest that 
challenges to the legal basis of a war always present a political 
question.66  
II.  THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
A. A Primer on the Modern Political Question Doctrine 
The political question doctrine, rooted in the separation of 
powers, limits judicial review of certain types of cases and 
controversies.67 The Supreme Court has always considered certain 
cases nonjusticiable because they fall within the doctrine, although the 
parameters of the doctrine have shifted over time.68 The Court 
formulated the modern test in Baker v. Carr,69 the “seminal case” in 
this area.70 Baker established criteria for courts to use in determining 
whether a case implicates the political question doctrine.71 The Court 
noted that political questions are particularly likely to arise in cases 
involving:  
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable 
 
 63. Id. at 298 (finding that the question whether ISIS was appropriately targeted was 
inseparable from the question whether the campaign against ISIS was “necessary and 
appropriate” under either AUMF (quoting the 2001 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a))). 
 64. See id. at 302–03 (noting several post-Vietnam decisions that declined to reach the 
question whether Congress had authorized particular military actions). 
 65. See infra Part II.B. 
 66. Id. at 298 (characterizing the question whether military action is either “necessary” or 
“appropriate” as being committed to the “political branches” and therefore nonjusticiable). 
 67. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question 
is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). 
 68. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803) (opinion of 
Marshall, J.) (noting that where the Constitution vests the President with “certain important 
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion,” the courts have no 
jurisdiction), with Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939) (noting that “the class of 
questions deemed to be political” stems from the need for finality of decisions by the political 
branches and “the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination”). 
 69. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 70. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 71. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
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and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.72 
The Baker Court noted that certain fields, such as foreign affairs, 
would be more likely to involve a political question than others.73 
However, the Court also noted that “it is error to suppose that every 
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial 
cognizance”74 and observed that courts can examine “executive 
proclamations” relating to “belligerency abroad” to determine the 
rights of Americans or others.75 The Court recognized the need for the 
finality that stems from a determination that a conflict has officially 
ended for legal purposes, and finality would be furthered by finding a 
political question.76 Yet, the Court also noted that if a particular issue 
is to be deemed a political question, that finding must rest on “isolable 
reasons for presence of political questions” in the specific factual 
context.77 That is, the political question doctrine does not allow a 
blanket determination that all questions involving war or foreign 
affairs must be kept out of the courts because of judicial incapacity to 
resolve such questions.78 
Subsequent decisions refined the doctrine. In Nixon v. United 
States,79 the Court relied solely on the first two Baker criteria in 
dismissing a challenge by a federal judge to his impeachment by 
Congress; the Court cited only the “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department” and “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it.”80 While Nixon did not explicitly state that a 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 211–16 (reviewing subject areas that had been frequently found to implicate 
political questions). 
 74. Id. at 211. 
 75. Id. at 212. 
 76. Id. at 213–14. 
 77. Id. at 213. 
 78. Id. at 213. 
 79. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 225 (1993). 
 80. Id. at 228 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).  
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case could not present a political question based solely on the four 
remaining Baker factors, the Court implied that textual commitment 
or a lack of manageable judicial standards would be critical to finding 
a political question.81 
The Court went further in Zivotofsky I and substantially narrowed 
the scope of the political question doctrine.82 The case involved an 
American citizen, born in Jerusalem, who wished for his passport to list 
his place of birth as “Jerusalem, Israel.”83 A 2002 statute required the 
State Department to record the place of birth of a U.S. citizen born in 
Jerusalem as Israel if requested by the passport holder.84 The State 
Department refused to issue the passport as requested, following a 
State Department policy that directly contradicted the statute.85 After 
several years of litigation on a variety of issues, the D.C. Circuit upheld 
dismissal on the grounds that the case presented a political question.86  
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, reversed. First, the 
Court reiterated the primacy of the first two Baker factors in 
determining the existence of a political question.87 Second, the Court 
emphasized the “existence of a statutory right” on the part of the 
plaintiff as being “relevant to the Judiciary’s power to decide” the 
matter, despite the centrality of sensitive foreign affairs concerns to the 
case.88 Finally, while the Court noted that the D.C. Circuit had 
remanded the case to develop the record regarding the “foreign policy 
implications” of the statute,89 the Supreme Court did not even mention 
the remaining “prudential” concerns from Baker as grounds for finding 
 
 81. See id. at 229 (stating the standard for the political question inquiry and omitting the four 
remaining Baker criteria). 
 82. See 3 VED P. NANDA, DAVID K. PANSIUS & BRYAN NEIHART, LITIGATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS, § 14:3 (2d ed. 2018) (explaining that Zivotofsky I 
likely precludes recourse to the political question doctrine based on the “prudential factors 
alone”). But see The Supreme Court 2011 Term—Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 176, 316–17 
(2012) (arguing that any narrowing of prudential factors in the political question doctrine should 
not apply to challenges implicating the WPR). 
 83. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 192–93. 
 84. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d), 
116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002). 
 85. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 191–93. 
 86. Id. at 193–94.  
 87. See id. at 196 (analyzing the political question doctrine by solely considering the 
applicability of textual commitment and the absence of judicially manageable standards). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 193. 
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a political question.90 Zivotofsky I cemented the necessity of 
demonstrating either textual commitment to the political branches or 
a lack of judicially manageable standards before an issue can be 
considered a political question; this refinement significantly narrowed 
the field of cases to which the doctrine can be applied.91 Further, 
Zivotofsky I raised the possibility that the existence of a statutory right 
could weigh against categorizing an issue as a political question.92 
B. The Political Question Doctrine and Challenges to Military Action 
Challenges to military action predate the Supreme Court’s 
modern formulation of the political question doctrine in Baker. 
Notwithstanding justiciability concerns, plaintiffs have challenged the 
legal basis for specific uses of military force since the Founding of the 
republic.93 Precedent supports the proposition that the exercise of the 
war powers, shared by the executive and Congress, is judicially 
reviewable. A brief survey illustrates the courts’ willingness to delve 
into questions regarding the use of force. In each case, the reviewing 
court found, either explicitly or by implication, that the use of military 
force is not committed to the absolute discretion of the executive 
branch. Further, courts found or fashioned appropriate standards by 
which to decide these cases.  
 
 90. See id. at 204, 210 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(describing the final three Baker factors as founded on “prudence,” and concurring on the basis 
of a “textual commitment”); id. at 212–13 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the final four Baker 
factors as “prudential”). 
 91. See NANDA et al., supra note 82 (describing the substantial impact of Zivotofsky I); see 
also Chris Michel, Comment, There’s No Such Thing as a Political Question of Statutory 
Interpretation: The Implications of Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 123 YALE L.J. 253, 260 (2013) (“[T]he 
rule against statutory political questions should be recognized as the law of the land.”); Alex 
Loomis, Why Are the Lower Courts (Mostly) Ignoring Zivotofsky I’s Political Question Analysis?, 
LAWFARE (May 19, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-are-lower-courts-mostly-ignoring-
zivotofsky-political-question-analysis [https://perma.cc/Q7X8-7SCE] (arguing that Zivotofsky I 
“lopp[ed] off the prudential Baker factors”). 
 92. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 196 (“The existence of a statutory right, however, is certainly 
relevant to the Judiciary’s power to decide [the] claim.”). Interestingly, the Supreme Court later 
ruled that while the case did not raise a political question, the President had the independent 
constitutional authority under the Recognition Power to issue the passport omitting the word 
“Israel,” despite the statute to the contrary. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 
2096 (2015) (Zivotofsky II). Justice Breyer concurred, noting that he still believed that the case 
presented a political question. Id. at 2096 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 93. See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 37–39, 46 (1800) (holding that the Court was 
competent to determine against whom Congress authorized the use of force by reference to the 
statute and factual record). 
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1. A Textually Demonstrable Commitment.  Since the Founding, 
the Supreme Court has considered justiciable the question whether a 
congressional enactment provides a legal basis for the use of force 
against another nation. The Court first implicitly addressed this issue 
in Bas v. Tingy94 during the Quasi-War of 1798–99.95 The case involved 
an American warship that recaptured an American vessel seized by 
France.96 The captain of the American warship sued for half the value 
of the salvage under a 1799 law.97 The question turned on whether the 
word “enemy” in the 1799 law referred to France.98 The Court 
implicitly recognized its own competence to determine who was 
targeted by a statutory authorization of the use of force,99 and it 
interpreted “enemy” to refer to France.100 The Court used traditional 
tools of statutory interpretation to answer this question, reading the 
statute in accordance with the existing legal and factual 
circumstances.101 In that context, the meaning of “enemy” was made 
clear by a previous statute’s reference to France as a hostile power.102  
The modern Supreme Court’s clearest rejection of the proposition 
that the war power is textually committed solely to the executive is 
found in the landmark case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,103 
which was decided in the midst of the Korean War.104 It is difficult to 
overstate the magnitude of the executive decision that was challenged 
in the case. Fearing the results of a threatened strike at the nation’s 
largest steel mills, President Harry S. Truman announced his decision 
to seize the nation’s steel industry and to operate the plants under 
federal control in order to ensure the continued availability of critical 
war matériel.105 The district court enjoined the seizure, rejecting the 
 
 94. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
 95. See id. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.) (describing the larger question of the case as 
“whether, at the time of passing the act of congress of the 2d of March 1799, there subsisted a 
state of war between” the United States and France).  
 96. Id. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 97. Id. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.). 
 98. Id. at 45 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 99. See id. at 40–43. (opinion of Washington, J.) (analyzing the issue without explicitly 
addressing the Court’s competence to do so). 
 100. Id. at 42. 
 101. Id. at 41–42. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 104. Id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that 
declaration of a war is entrusted only to Congress.”). 
 105. Id. at 582–84 (majority opinion). 
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Government’s argument that the President had the “inherent power” 
to take the action.106 The Supreme Court’s decision is known primarily 
for Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, which lays out a framework 
analyzing separation of powers claims.107 The opinion categorized 
executive actions into three major categories. In the first, where “the 
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress,” he can wield the full inherent authority of the executive as 
well as any authority that Congress can delegate.108 In the second, the 
“zone of twilight” where Congress has neither authorized nor 
prohibited the President’s actions, “any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables 
rather than on abstract theories of law.”109 Finally, where the President 
has acted contrary to a congressional enactment, “then he can rely only 
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress.”110  
This reasoning presaged the Court’s modern political question 
jurisprudence. In essence, where the text of the Constitution or of a 
statute requires that a question falls squarely to the President and the 
President alone, then the President’s resolution of that question is not 
subject to judicial examination. In Youngstown, Jackson reasoned that 
Congress had not left the subject area “an open field,” but that it had 
instead enacted a variety of statutes governing the seizure of private 
property under wartime conditions.111 Rejecting exclusive presidential 
control over foreign affairs, Justice Jackson argued:  
[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me 
more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of 
foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, 
can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country 
by his own commitment of the Nation’s armed forces to some foreign 
venture.112 
 
 106. Id. at 584. 
 107. Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES, 
233, 266 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 108. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 637. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 639. 
 112. Id. at 642. 
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Finally, despite a general reluctance to hear challenges to the 
Vietnam War,113 two significant circuit court decisions rejected efforts 
by President Richard Nixon to reduce Congress’s role in war-making 
decisions. First, in Orlando v. Laird,114 the Second Circuit held that 
Congress can authorize a war, absent a stand-alone declaration of war 
or other explicit authorization, by appropriating funds with the 
understanding that the executive will use them to conduct the war in 
question.115 Second, in Massachusetts v. Laird,116 the First Circuit held 
that congressional enactments other than formal declarations of war 
can provide sufficient constitutional authorization for the challenged 
use of force.117 Both cases rejected the executive’s position that Article 
II gives the President sole authority to determine whether the United 
States is at war. 
Even in those cases where courts have dismissed challenges to the 
use of force as political questions, they have generally exercised care in 
precisely delineating which executive-branch actions are implicated by 
the doctrine.118 In El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States,119 the 
D.C. Circuit120 dismissed a suit brought by the owners of a Sudanese 
pharmaceutical plant that had been bombed by the United States; the 
court cited the political question doctrine as the basis for the 
 
 113. Vladeck, supra note 2, at 47. 
 114. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 115. Id. at 1042–43.  
 116. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971). 
 117. See id. at 34 (finding that “steady [c]ongressional support” for the Vietnam War provided 
a sufficient legal basis for the executive to continue prosecuting the war, despite the lack of a 
formal declaration of war). 
 118. See Vladeck, supra note 2, at 47 (describing the Supreme Court as using “every way 
imaginable” to avoid deciding challenges to the Vietnam War on the merits); see also, e.g., El-
Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (differentiating 
between cases challenging the wisdom of policy choices, which the court characterized as political 
questions, and “claims ‘[p]resenting purely legal issues’ such as whether the government had legal 
authority to act”). 
 119. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 120. The D.C. Circuit is widely perceived to have outsized influence in developing and 
applying separation of powers doctrine. See Patricia M. Wald, Senate Must Act on Appeals Court 
Vacancies, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2013) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/senate-must-
act-on-appeals-court-vacancies/2013/02/28/e8ad3d3a-8051-11e2-b99e-6baf4ebe42df_story.html? 
noredirect=on&utm_term=.239cd8ced2d5 [https://perma.cc/8YFF-Z9R3] (noting, based in part 
on her time as Chief Judge, the D.C. Circuit’s unique role in resolving “constitutional questions 
involving separation of powers and executive prerogatives”). This may be due to that court’s 
relatively high administrative law caseload. Eric M. Fraser, David K. Kessler, Matthew J.B. 
Lawrence & Stephen A. Calhoun, The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 131, 138 (2013). Whatever the reason, it seems likely that opinions from the D.C. Circuit 
would be treated as particularly relevant in this area by other courts. 
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dismissal.121 After noting that “the political question doctrine does not 
bar a claim that the government has violated the Constitution simply 
because the claim implicates foreign relations,”122 the court found that 
the ability of a claim to survive such a bar “turns not on the nature of 
the government conduct under review but . . . on the question the 
plaintiff raises about the challenged action.”123 This approach 
differentiates between challenges to the prudence of military action 
abroad, which present a political question, and challenges to the 
statutory authority of the government to take an action; the El-Shifa 
court implied that challenges in the latter category are justiciable and 
do not present political questions. 
2. Judicially Manageable Standards.  The requirement for 
judicially manageable standards—the second prong of the post–
Zivotofsky I political question doctrine—has not completely barred 
questions that implicate the war powers. While courts have consistently 
found that claims challenging the substance of the political branches’ 
decisions necessarily involve political questions,124 this bar does not 
extend to challenges to the legality of military action.125 Instead, where 
individuals’ statutory or constitutional rights are threatened, courts 
have fashioned standards to resolve the specific disputes before 
them.126 For instance, courts must answer questions such as whether a 
 
 121. See El-Shifa Pharm., 607 F.3d at 844 (affirming dismissal as a political question). 
 122. Id. at 841 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). 
 123. Id. at 842 (citing Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., 
concurring) (arguing that claims brought by members of Congress challenging the 
constitutionality of the use of military force against Yugoslavia did not present a nonjusticiable 
political question)). This issue was explored in greater detail in a concurrence by then-Judge 
Kavanaugh; his opinion affirmed dismissal but rejected the majority’s application of the political 
question doctrine and accused the majority of a “sub silentio” expansion of executive power at 
the expense of Congress. Id. at 855 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 124. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6, 8 (1973) (finding that a challenge to the 
content of training provided to National Guardsman was a political question, due to both an 
explicit textual commitment and a lack of manageable standards); see also Nixon v. United States, 
506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (finding that the word “try” “lacks sufficient precision” to define any 
manageable standards). 
 125. Vladeck, supra note 2, at 51–52; see also, e.g., El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 842 (implying that 
courts may hear challenges to the legal basis for military action). 
 126. See, e.g., Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837–38, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (adopting language 
derived from the 2001 AUMF to determine whether a detainee was a member of an organization 
covered by the statute); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334–35 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
that judicial notice of facts in the world can be sufficient to establish a manageable standard for 
determining whether a state of war exists); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (D.D.C. 
1990) (same). 
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state of war exists, how the enemy is appropriately defined, and what 
constitutional clause or statute provides a legal basis for a military 
action.127 
For most of American history, federal courts have demonstrated 
a willingness and ability to find facts sufficient to show the existence of 
war. In the early days of the Civil War, the Brig Amy Warwick128 arose 
out of President Abraham Lincoln’s decision to implement a naval 
blockade of Southern ports following the secession of the Confederate 
states.129 The Court ultimately upheld some of the seizures that resulted 
from the blockade,130 finding that the President had a sound legal basis 
for determining that a state of war existed as a matter of fact as the 
result of the insurrection of the Confederate states.131  
The Korean War–era Youngstown decision also addressed this 
question. The Court implicitly recognized courts’ competence in use-
of-force contexts to determine both the meaning of the factual record 
and Congress’s intent in passing legislation. After all, application of 
Justice Jackson’s test for concurrence between executive action and 
congressional approval requires, on its face, a determination of what 
exactly Congress has authorized.132 Similarly, the El-Shifa court 
reiterated the competence of courts to adjudicate issues that may be 
closely intertwined with political questions, specifically citing the 
ability of courts to determine “whether the government has followed 
the proper procedures . . . and whether [an organization] has engaged 
in terrorist activity,” without having to reach the question whether the 
government’s militaristic response was necessary and appropriate 
under a statute.133 Youngstown’s analysis recognizes that many related 
 
 127. Bas v. Tingy, 4. U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 41 (1800) (opinion of Washington, J.) (analyzing the 
identity of the enemy); Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1335 (analyzing the existence of war); Orlando v. Laird, 
443 F.2d 1039, 1042–43 (2d Cir. 1971) (analyzing the statutory basis for military action). 
 128. Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
 129. See id. at 666 (describing the facts of the blockade that led to the seizure of the four ships 
in question). 
 130. See id. at 674–82 (affirming the seizure of the Amy Warwick, Hiawatha, Brilliante, and 
Crenshaw).  
 131. See id. at 670 (finding that the question whether an insurrection is sufficiently serious to 
become a civil war “is a question to be decided by” the President). The decision of the Amy 
Warwick Court also explicitly affirmed Congress’s sole right to declare war where a de facto state 
of war did not already exist. Id. at 668. 
 132. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
Jackson went on to state that the President, acting “pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress,” is legally able to take such an action unless “the Federal Government 
as an undivided whole lacks [such] power.” Id. 
 133. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 843 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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questions may ultimately be nonjusticiable where they only challenge 
the wisdom of the government action in question; it also acknowledges 
that questions that do not seek such determinations should be heard by 
courts.134 
More than a century later, in Koohi v. United States,135 the Ninth 
Circuit addressed a question that was similarly intertwined with the 
determination (or lack thereof) of a state of war by the political 
branches. The case arose during the “tanker war,” in which the U.S. 
Navy skirmished with Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf.136 U.S. forces 
were supporting Iraq in the ongoing Iran-Iraq War, with the goal of 
ensuring the continuing flow of crude oil from the Gulf; the Iranians 
sought to destroy Kuwaiti shipping (which carried Iraqi oil) and to 
thereby choke off Iraq’s economic lifeline.137 Koohi raised the question 
whether the accidental downing of an Iranian passenger jet by the USS 
Vincennes on July 3, 1988, took place during a “time of war.”138 The 
court found itself competent to answer that question using “the normal 
tools of our trade—reason and judgment.”139 The court held that a state 
of war existed, for the purposes of the statute at hand, “when, as a 
result of a deliberate decision by the executive branch, United States 
armed forces engaged in an organized series of hostile encounters on a 
significant scale with the military forces of another nation.”140 The 
court concluded that the tanker war between the United States and 
Iran in the late 1980s met that standard despite the lack of formal 
congressional authorization.141 
A more recent case explicitly addressed both prongs of the 
political question doctrine. The court in Dellums v. Bush142 declined to 
extend the political question doctrine to grant the executive branch 
broader authority to determine the existence of a war as a factual 
matter. In the run-up to the Persian Gulf War, the plaintiffs—sitting 
members of Congress—sought to enjoin President George H.W. Bush 
from going to war against Iraq absent explicit congressional 
 
 134. Id. at 842. 
 135. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 136. Id. at 1329–30. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1333. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1335. 
 141. Id. at 1334–35. 
 142. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). 
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authorization.143 Responding to a claim that Congress had not 
authorized such a war, the Government asked the court to find that the 
complaint raised a political question and should be dismissed on those 
grounds; it argued that there are no judicially manageable standards 
for determining whether the United States is at war.144 The court 
demurred, stating that such an understanding of the political question 
doctrine is “far too sweeping to be accepted by the courts” and that 
granting the executive “the sole power to determine that any particular 
offensive military operation . . . does not constitute war-making . . . 
would evade the plain language of the Constitution, and . . . cannot 
stand.”145 The court ultimately dismissed the case on ripeness 
grounds.146 
3. An Illustrative Example: Military Detainees.  Courts have often 
answered questions related to the war powers in cases where plaintiffs 
challenge the authority of the U.S. government to detain individuals 
captured overseas. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,147 Boumediene v. Bush,148 and 
Parhat v. Gates149 all illustrate the tools available to courts in 
determining the presence or absence of a statutory basis for military 
action. These cases demonstrate that there often are judicially 
manageable standards by which a court can ascertain whether a certain 
individual or group falls within the ambit of a statute authorizing 
military action. 
Hamdi was the first case in which an enemy combatant’s habeas 
petition reached the Supreme Court.150 There, the Court found that 
Congress had authorized Hamdi’s detention under the 2001 AUMF.151 
In making that finding, the Court relied on a determination that the 
detainee was, “in fact, an enemy combatant; whether that is established 
 
 143. Id. at 1143. 
 144. See id. at 1145 (noting that the Government asked the court to apply the political 
question doctrine). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 1152 (finding that the executive had not “shown a commitment to a definitive 
course of action sufficient to support ripeness”). 
 147. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 148. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 149. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 150. Robert M. Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal 
Architecture of Counterterrorism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 163, 172 (2013). 
 151. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (finding that statutory authority for the detention did exist, 
and therefore declining to reach the question whether the President had inherent Article II 
authority for the detention). 
HOWE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  3:52 PM 
2019] POLITICAL QUESTIONS AFTER SMITH 1251 
by concession or by some other process that verifies this fact with 
sufficient certainty seems beside the point.”152 The Court envisioned 
that this “enemy combatant” determination could be made “in a 
proceeding that comports with due process.”153 This point was further 
emphasized in Boumediene, which implied that courts have the 
capacity to review the “standards and procedures” at a Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”).154 Both the Government and the 
Court characterized “the CSRT process as direct review of the 
executive’s battlefield determination that the detainee [was] an enemy 
combatant.”155 The Court further noted that “a challenge to the 
President’s authority to detain is, in essence, a challenge to the 
Department’s definition of enemy combatant, a ‘standard’ used by 
CSRTs” in the proceedings of the military commission below.156 Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the majority showed significant deference to 
determinations made by the executive; however, the opinion also 
found that courts are competent to issue rulings on the question 
whether an individual falls within the ambit of the 2001 AUMF and to 
devise adequate standards for making that determination.  
The D.C. Circuit has also applied the language of the 2001 AUMF 
to determine whether certain groups or individuals fall within the scope 
of the authorization. In Parhat v. Gates, the court invalidated the 
detention of a Chinese national who was captured in Afghanistan.157 
Applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, the court 
determined that the available evidence did not support the 
Government’s contention that Parhat—a member of a Uighur 
separatist group who had been captured in Afghanistan—was an 
enemy combatant who could be targeted under the 2001 AUMF.158 In 
making this determination, the court relied partly on a Navy 
memorandum defining an enemy combatant as: 
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida 
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who 
 
 152. Id. at 523. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787–88 (2008).  
 155. Id. at 783. 
 156. Id. at 788. 
 157. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 158. Id. at 835. 
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has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in 
aid of enemy armed forces.159 
The Government relied on the fact that Parhat was affiliated with 
the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (“ETIM”), a Uighur Muslim 
group that the Government claimed was “associated” with al Qaeda 
within the meaning of the Navy memorandum.160 The court looked to 
classified and unclassified evidence derived from interviews with 
ETIM members and other sources.161 While the court ultimately 
determined that the evidence presented to the CSRT was insufficient 
to sustain a finding that Parhat was an enemy combatant,162 the court 
strongly implied that executive tribunals (like the CSRT) and Article 
III courts are competent to determine whether individuals and 
organizations fall within the AUMF-derived definition of “associated 
forces” where sufficient evidence has been presented.163 
These precedents illustrate the competence of federal courts to 
determine whether executive action in the realm of foreign and 
military affairs has a legal basis. In fact, these precedents explicitly 
reject the idea that the Constitution grants absolute discretion in this 
area to the President. Furthermore, courts have proven capable of 
formulating standards of decision based both on standards developed 
within the executive branch and on careful review of sensitive and 
classified records. 
III.  LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE ISIS CAMPAIGN 
The Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations all argued that they 
had sufficient statutory and constitutional authority to wage war 
against ISIS and its predecessors. The Obama administration, in 
particular, articulated several legal theories to justify the war between 
September 2014 and December 2016.164 The most comprehensive legal 
analysis of the issue from the executive branch is contained in a 
memorandum the Obama administration released to the public in 
 
 159. Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y of Def. to Sec’y of the Navy, Order Establishing 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal ¶ a (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter CSTR Order]. 
 160. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 838. 
 161. Id. at 846–47. 
 162. Id. at 848. 
 163. Id. at 850. 
 164. Compare DEC. 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 10, at 3–8 (basing legal authority for 
military action against ISIS on the 2001 AUMF), with Sept. 2014 Presidential Address, supra note 
29, at 3 (asserting constitutional authority to combat ISIS). 
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December 2016.165 Yet, these asserted statutory and constitutional 
arguments undermine two pillars of the Government’s political 
question defense—the claim that Congress does not have the authority 
to regulate the President’s actions in this area, and the claim that there 
are no judicially manageable standards against which to measure 
executive action. 
In his address to the nation on September 10, 2014, in which he 
announced the military campaign against ISIS, President Obama 
identified two statutory bases of authority for the proposed military 
operations: the 2001 AUMF against al Qaeda and associated forces and 
the 2002 AUMF against Iraq.166 He also indicated that he would inform 
Congress “consistent with” the 1973 WPR.167 Congress subsequently 
enacted legislation formally authorizing and funding the military 
campaign against ISIS.168 It is unclear whether these enactments could 
form an independent basis of executive authority for the military 
actions.169   
A. The War Powers Resolution 
The WPR creates a statutory impediment to the unilateral 
employment of force abroad by the President.170 The WPR was enacted 
in 1973 as a response to what Congress believed was the failure of the 
executive branch to provide accurate and honest information to 
Congress during the Vietnam War and as a response to the expansion 
 
 165. DEC. 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 10, at 3–8. The Trump administration appears to 
rely on the same or similar arguments. See Faulkner, supra note 35, at 1–2. 
 166. Letter from President Barack Obama to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the 
Deployment of United States Armed Forces Personnel to Iraq and the Authorization of Military 
Operations in Syria 1 (Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Sept. 2014 Letter], https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400697/pdf/DCPD-201400697.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EQJ-3CE3]. 
 167. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1541–48 (2012)); Sept. 2014 Letter, supra note 166, at 1. 
 168. See infra Part III.D. 
 169. Cf. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming dismissal on political 
question grounds of a suit filed by servicemen challenging the statutory authority of military 
action in Vietnam, and finding that congressional enactment of appropriations legislation is 
sufficient to find “mutual participation between the Congress and the President”). But see 50 
U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (directing courts not to interpret any provision in appropriations legislation 
as constituting the basis for introducing armed forces into hostilities unless Congress clearly 
expressed such intent within the legislation). 
 170. Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 
101, 102 (1984). 
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of the war beyond what was statutorily authorized by Congress.171 It 
establishes reporting requirements for the employment or deployment 
of American military forces, and it requires that the President obtain 
the consent of Congress before introducing American military forces 
into hostilities.172 The WPR has four major provisions that work to 
achieve this purpose. 
First, the WPR requires the President to “consult” with Congress 
“in every possible instance” before introducing American military 
forces into hostilities.173 Legislative history indicates that the 
congressional drafters intended the process of consultation to be 
something more than merely informing Congress of a proposed or 
already-accomplished action.174 It further requires regular consultation 
of Congress until American forces have been removed from the 
situation in question.175 The statute does not, however, define 
“consultation.”  
Second, the WPR requires that the President regularly report to 
Congress every time he takes an action that implicates the WPR.176 
Section 4(a)(1) places particularly stringent reporting requirements on 
the President, requiring a report within forty-eight hours any time he 
places forces “into hostilities or into situations where imminent 
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”177 
Legislative history indicates that Congress used the term “hostilities” 
instead of “armed conflict” because it considered the former term to 
be broader, encompassing more of the activities that Congress 
intended to cover.178  
 
 171. See Thomas F. Eagleton, Congress: Does It Abdicate Its Power?, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 1, 3–4 (2000) (describing the goals of Congress in enacting the WPR, and discussing the 
WPR’s failure to reach those goals, in the eyes of the U.S. Senator who was the bill’s author and 
original sponsor). 
 172. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-547, at 7–8 (1973) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2363, 2363–64 (defining the “[p]urpose and [p]olicy” of the WPR). 
 173. 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
 174. H.R. REP. NO. 93-547, at 7 (1973) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2363, 
2363–64; see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 21 (1973) (Cmte. Rep.), as reprinted in 1973 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2349–50 (noting that the purpose of the legislation was to reaffirm the 
primacy of Congress in authorizing war while recognizing the obligation of the President to 
defend the country in an emergency). 
 175. 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
 176. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a). 
 177. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1). 
 178. H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 2351 (1973) (noting that “hostilities” would include “a state of 
confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of 
armed conflict”). 
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Third, the WPR requires the President to take affirmative action 
to remove any forces committed to hostilities falling under the purview 
of section 4(a)(1) unless certain requirements are met within a sixty-
day period.179 This section also includes a provision allowing Congress 
to require the President to withdraw forces at any time upon passage 
of a joint resolution.180 These provisions can only be waived by a 
declaration of war, another authorization for the use of force by 
Congress, by the extension of the sixty-day period by subsequent 
legislation, or by the physical inability of Congress to meet as the result 
of an attack on the United States itself.181  
Finally, the WPR sets out guidelines for determining whether 
subsequent legislation constitutes an authorization for the use of force 
under the WPR.182 Notably, given the backdrop of the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Orlando v. Laird, section 8(a) of the WPR states that 
legislation—including appropriations legislation—that does not 
specifically authorize the introduction of American forces into 
hostilities shall not be construed as constituting a declaration of war or 
authorization of force under section 5(c).183  
The WPR was passed over the veto of President Nixon.184 Since 
that time, every President has contended that the WPR represents an 
unconstitutional infringement on the President’s constitutional 
authority as Commander in Chief.185 Despite these criticisms, 
Presidents have largely complied with the reporting requirements 
 
 179. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). The statute provides for an initial sixty-day period, but the President 
can unilaterally extend the period to ninety days if he certifies that there exists an “unavoidable 
military necessity” requiring a longer period of time in which to safely redeploy the forces in 
question. Id. Commentators have noted that this provision may also authorize the broad use of 
military force by the President, as long as hostilities cease within sixty days. H. JEFFERSON 
POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 123 (2002).  
 180. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c). 
 181. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). 
 182. 50 U.S.C. § 1547. 
 183. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1); see also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(finding authorization for the Vietnam War, based on enacted appropriations).  
 184. Carter, supra note 170, at 102 n.6. 
 185. MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42699, THE WAR POWERS 
RESOLUTION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 6 (2017); see, e.g., Overview of the War Powers 
Resolution, 28 Op. O.L.C. 271, 273 (1984) (arguing that the WPR is unconstitutional); see also 
Alan Greenblatt, Why The War Powers Act Doesn’t Work, N.P.R. (June 16, 2011), 
https://www.npr.org/2011/06/16/137222043/why-the-war-powers-act-doesnt-work [https:// 
perma.cc/8ZFB-MKPW] (noting that “no president has accepted the constitutionality of the War 
Powers Act”). 
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established under the WPR.186 In that sense, the WPR seems to have 
been effective in forcing the executive branch to provide congressional 
leaders with information that might have otherwise been withheld. 
B. The 2001 AUMF  
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress 
enacted the 2001 AUMF.187 It authorizes the President to use “all 
necessary and appropriate force . . . to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States” by al Qaeda and 
associated forces.188 It further authorizes the use of such force against 
any “nations, organizations, or persons” who “planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . or harbored such 
organizations or persons.”189 The AUMF does not expire.190 Congress 
declared that the AUMF constitutes authorization for the President to 
introduce American forces into hostilities under the WPR.191 
The AUMF provided the asserted legal basis for the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001 and for the continuing military operations in that 
country.192 The Bush and Obama administrations also relied on the 
2001 AUMF for statutory authority to conduct military operations 
against al Qaeda and affiliated entities in the Philippines, Somalia, 
Yemen, Pakistan, Libya, and elsewhere.193 
 
 186. See WEED, supra note 185, at 57–84 (listing 168 instances where Presidents reported to 
Congress, consistent with the WPR, compared to 19 instances where they did not). 
 187. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 286 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal 
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (describing the 
passage of the 2001 AUMF). 
 188. 2001 AUMF § 2(a). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Jack Goldsmith, Why a Sunset Clause is Important in Any New AUMF, LAWFARE, (Feb. 
5, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-sunset-clause-important-any-new-aumf [https://
perma.cc/D3N5-K3J8]. 
 191. 2001 AUMF § 2(b)(1). 
 192. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2066–68 (2005) (noting that the 2001 AUMF provided the 
legal authorization for the Afghanistan campaign). 
 193. See MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43983, 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR 
USE OF MILITARY FORCE: ISSUES CONCERNING ITS CONTINUED APPLICATION 5 (2015) (stating 
that the Obama administration had also conducted “other military operations in . . . Pakistan and 
Libya” under the authority of the 2001 AUMF); Memorandum from Matthew Weed, Analyst in 
Foreign Policy Legislation, Cong. Research Serv., to Congresswoman Barbara Lee 3–4 (July 10, 
2013) (listing all presidential notifications to Congress referencing the 2001 AUMF between 
September 2001 and June 2013). 
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Both the Bush and Obama administrations developed and refined 
the concept of targeting “associated forces” under the 2001 AUMF as 
the threat from al Qaeda was mitigated over time. For example, in 
2004, the Bush administration defined the scope of CSRTs to include 
authority over combatants captured while fighting as part of 
“associated forces” without providing a specific definition for that 
term.194  
The Obama administration formulated this interpretation in a 
2012 speech by then–General Counsel of the Department of Defense 
Jeh C. Johnson.195 The administration defined an “associated force” as 
“(1) . . . an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside 
al Qaeda, and (2) . . . a cobelligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners.”196 By September 2014, the 
Obama administration asserted that ISIS fell within this definition of 
“associated forces” and, accordingly, that no additional congressional 
authorization was required to pursue military action against the 
group.197 Stephen W. Preston, Johnson’s successor as General Counsel 
at the Department of Defense, further elaborated this theory in an 
April 2015 speech to the American Society of International Law.198 
Relying on Johnson’s 2012 definition, Preston argued that ISIS had 
been an “associated force” within the meaning of the statute since at 
least 2004.199 He argued that neither the existence of conflict between 
ISIS and al Qaeda nor the fact that al Qaeda and other groups might 
“splinter[] into rival factions” should limit the powers available to the 
executive branch under the AUMF. Preston reasoned that to consider 
such things would be to allow the enemy, rather than congressional 
intent, to control the meaning of the statute.200 
 
 194. See CSTR Order, supra note 159, ¶ a (defining “enemy combatant” to include any person 
“supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners”); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 192, at 
2113–16 (arguing that individuals or groups can come within the ambit of the 2001 AUMF by 
joining al Qaeda in its conflict against the United States at some point after the passage of the 
statute). 
 195. See Johnson, supra note 33, at 145–46 (describing the legal framework for targeting 
“associated forces” of al Qaeda). 
 196. Id. at 146. 
 197. Savage, supra note 10. 
 198. Preston, supra note 16, at 2–11 (discussing the legal framework for American military 
action under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs). 
 199. Id. at 4–7. 
 200. Id.  
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C. The 2002 AUMF  
In October 2002, Congress authorized military force against the 
government of Iraq as part of the 2002 AUMF.201 The statute was 
predominately predicated on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s 
regime,202 but it also includes a provision identifying the alleged 
presence of al Qaeda as grounds for the authorization.203 The statute 
authorizes the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States 
as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to . . . defend 
the national security of the United States against the continuing threat 
posed by Iraq.”204 As with the 2001 AUMF, Congress determined that 
the legislation “constitut[ed] specific statutory authorization within the 
meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.”205 And like 
the 2001 AUMF, the 2002 AUMF has no prescribed expiration date.206 
The 2002 AUMF served as the legal basis for the April 2003 
invasion of Iraq.207 Similarly, following the invasion, the 2002 AUMF 
also constituted the statutory basis for the enduring presence of 
American forces in Iraq; the executive branch interpreted the 2002 
AUMF as permitting the continued combat deployment of American 
forces to assist Iraqi government forces against AQI (the predecessor 
of ISIS) and other insurgent groups.208 Until either the President or 
Congress declares the conflict officially over, the 2002 AUMF will 
remain in effect.209 The Obama administration did not initially rely on 
the 2002 AUMF for the military campaign against ISIS, but the 
administration later argued that the Act did provide a legal basis.210 
 
 201. 2002 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. 
 202. Id. at 1498–1500. 
 203. Id. at 1499. 
 204. Id. § 3, 116 Stat. at 1501. 
 205. Id. 
 206. MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43760, A NEW AUTHORIZATION FOR 
USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND CURRENT PROPOSALS 2 
(2017). 
 207. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 192, at 2076.  
 208. See id. at 2104 n.258 (noting that the 2002 AUMF provided a basis for the occupation 
following the successful invasion of Iraq). 
 209. Cf. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 167 (1948) (holding that the President may 
continue to exercise war powers until the President or Congress formally terminates hostilities). 
 210. See Charlie Savage, Obama Sees Iraq Resolution as a Legal Basis for Airstrikes, Official 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/americas/obama-
sees-iraq-resolution-as-a-legal-basis-for-airstrikes-official-says.html [https://perma.cc/R3XV-
XP34] (describing the Obama administration’s understanding of the authorities provided by both 
the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs). 
HOWE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  3:52 PM 
2019] POLITICAL QUESTIONS AFTER SMITH 1259 
The Trump administration has also asserted that the 2002 AUMF 
provides a legal basis for ongoing military operations, including the 
anti-ISIS campaign.211 
D. Subsequent Authorization and Appropriations  
While President Obama’s declaration of hostilities against ISIS 
did not cite this legal basis,212 courts have recognized the authority of 
Congress to implicitly authorize the use of force in the form of 
subsequent authorizing and appropriating legislation.213 Section 8(a) of 
the WPR requires an express declaration of war or authorization of the 
use of military force.214 No court has explicitly considered the 
constitutionality of that provision.  
Congress’s subsequent enactment of appropriations legislation—
like that relied on by the Second Circuit in Orlando v. Laird—might 
still form the basis for an implicit authorization of the use of force 
under the theory that such subsequent congressional enactment 
overrules the WPR requirement for express authorization.215 This 
 
 211. See Letter from Donald Trump, President of the United States, to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/text-letter-president-speaker-house-
representatives-president-pro-tempore-senate-2/ [https://perma.cc/JN86-AC8D] (indicating that 
the 2002 AUMF, referred to herein as Public Law 107-243, provides statutory authority for the 
military activities detailed in the letter). 
 212. Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, supra note 25. 
 213. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that Congress had 
implicitly authorized continued intervention in Vietnam—despite the repeal of the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution—by extending the Selective Service Act and appropriating monies to fund the 
war). In footnotes, the Second Circuit further described the specific congressional acts that served 
as the basis for finding congressional approval, including authorizing legislation and 
appropriations bills. Id. at 1041–42 nn.1–3. Authorizing legislation, such as the National Defense 
Authorization Act, is legislation that specifies the ends to which the executive branch can (or 
must) carry out programs. Appropriations legislation provides the funding, the means, by which 
the executive branch can accomplish those ends. In the absence of congressional authorization, 
appropriations legislation is considered to implicitly authorize the programs and departments that 
it funds. See, for example, 36 Comp. Gen. 240, 242 (1956), stating: 
It is fundamental . . . that one Congress cannot bind a future Congress and that the 
Congress has full power to make an appropriation in excess of a cost limitation 
contained in the original authorization act. This authority is exercised as an incident to 
the power of the Congress to appropriate and regulate expenditures of the public 
money. 
 214. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1). 
 215. See, e.g., Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 OP. O.L.C. 327, 327 
(2000) [hereinafter O.L.C. Kosovo Memo] (stating that “relevant case law, historical practice, and 
basic principles of constitutional law lead to the conclusion that appropriation laws may authorize 
military combat”).  
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theory flows from the principle that one session of Congress cannot 
bind a future session of Congress through legislation.216 On this 
understanding, whatever the intent of the Ninety-Third Congress in 
enacting the WPR, Congress has effectively repealed that provision by 
repeatedly authorizing the use of military force implicitly through 
appropriations legislation.217 
In the time since President Obama first announced OIR, Congress 
has enacted both authorizing and appropriations legislation addressing 
and supporting U.S. efforts against ISIS.218 These laws have provided 
for funding of U.S. forces engaged in hostilities against ISIS, and they 
expressly contemplate the nature of the ongoing military operations.219 
Congress had enacted both appropriations supporting OIR and 
authorization language for certain aspects of the counter-ISIS 
campaign by the time Captain Smith filed his suit.220  
E. Independent Constitutional Authority for the ISIS Campaign 
Presidents Obama and Trump have also argued that inherent 
Article II authority provides a legal basis for the campaign against ISIS. 
 
 216. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (noting that “one legislature cannot 
abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature”); see also O.L.C. Kosovo Memo, supra note 215, 
at 342 (noting that the WPR did not “bind[] future Congresses, but instead establish[ed] a 
background principle against which Congress legislates”).  
 217. Cf. Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility: 
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1399 (1994) (noting 
that the Congress that passed the WPR was constitutionally precluded from preventing future 
Congresses from declaring war via appropriations legislation). 
 218. See Reply, supra note 42, at 10 (noting congressional enactments in support of the 
counter-ISIS campaign). 
 219. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2386–
87, 2393, 2397 (2015) (providing funding for counter-ISIS operations while prohibiting the use of 
funds that are in contravention of the WPR); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, 129 Stat. 726 §§ 1224, 1225(a) (2015) (requiring regular reporting to 
Congress on U.S. military forces supporting OIR, and expressly authorizing “defensive 
supportive fire” in support of the Syrian opposition); Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1236, 128 Stat. 
3292, 3558–62 (2014) (authorizing the President to provide assistance to coalition partners against 
ISIS); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat. 2130, 2276, 2301 §§ 8097, 9016 (2014) (providing funding for OIR and counter-ISIS 
operations).  
 220. Captain Smith filed his complaint on May 4, 2016. Complaint, supra note 37, at 1. 
Congress authorized the provision of assistance to allied forces fighting ISIS in the Carl Levin and 
Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 § 1236, 
which had an effective date of December 19, 2014. Congress specifically contemplated costs for 
OIR in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 § 8097, which had an 
effective date of December 16, 2014.  
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President Obama cited his Article II Commander in Chief authority in 
each formulation of the authorities underpinning the campaign, 
including his initial announcement to Congress.221 Similarly, by resting 
the legal basis for the campaign against ISIS at least in part on “U.S. 
national self-defense,”222 the Trump administration has implied that 
the President has independent constitutional authority to conduct the 
campaign. However, the Obama administration did not rely on the 
President’s inherent authority to conduct military action against ISIS 
in either the reply brief in Smith v. Obama or in the December 2016 
memorandum.223  
The President does not have the constitutional authority to 
unilaterally declare war.224 This understanding is supported by 
statute,225 case law,226 and historical practice.227 However, this 
restriction does leave room for significant discretion by the President. 
First, in the event that the United States is directly attacked, the 
President can respond using military force, despite the fact that 
Congress has not yet declared a war.228 Second, the President may be 
constitutionally authorized to take military actions in furtherance of 
 
 221. See Sept. 2014 Presidential Address, supra note 29, at 3 (“I have the authority to address 
the threat from ISIL . . . .”); Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, supra note 
25 (stating that the action was taken “pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. 
foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive”). 
 222. Faulkner, supra note 35. 
 223. See Gov’t Mem. of Law, supra note 48, at 2 (arguing that the suit raised a political 
question because the challenged military action was a matter committed to both the President 
and Congress); DEC. 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 10, at 7–8 (omitting Syria and Iraq from a 
discussion of the President’s inherent authority to take military action, but including them in a 
discussion of statutory authorization). 
 224. While the President did not formally concede this point in Smith v. Obama, the 
Government spent a significant proportion of its brief arguing that Congress had, in fact, 
authorized the campaign. See Gov’t Mem. of Law, supra note 48 at 8–13 (noting congressional 
action supporting OIR).  
 225. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (stating the purpose of the WPR as “insur[ing] that the collective 
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities”). 
 226. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted 
only to Congress.”). 
 227. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 45 (2013) (finding that 
“with the special exception of Korea, . . . all of America’s most consequential . . . conflicts” were 
authorized by Congress). 
 228. See POWELL, supra note 179, at 119 (noting that the President’s authority to take military 
action absent congressional action extends beyond circumstances where the President is 
responding to an attack). 
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important policy goals, even where the possible consequences of those 
actions include the possibility of provoking a war.229 For example, the 
President could likely deploy military forces—up to and including 
initiating hostilities—in support of an ally to whom the United States 
has treaty obligations.230 The Government did not raise any such 
argument in Smith v. Obama.231  
* * * 
The historical and legal record clearly demonstrates the active 
involvement of Congress in regulating the use of American force 
abroad; that congressional oversight undermines the presidential 
argument of exclusive control in this area. Congress has established a 
broad and reasonably comprehensive set of background rules severely 
limiting the legal authority of the President to act unilaterally in the use 
of military force. Further, Congress has enacted express authorizations 
in those instances where it permitted the use of military force. And, as 
described above, Congress has regulated in this fashion in the post-
Vietnam era, when members of Congress would presumably be aware 
of the growing hesitation of federal courts to challenge executive action 
in this area.232 At a minimum, the overlapping constitutional grants of 
authority and extensive statutory framework should trigger a careful 
analysis in Justice Jackson’s so-called “zone of twilight.”233 
IV.  THE SMITH COURT MISAPPLIED THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE 
The district court in Smith v. Obama did not conduct such an 
analysis. Instead, the court fundamentally misapplied the political 
question doctrine by holding that it precludes courts from determining 
whether a particular terrorist group falls within the scope of a 
congressional authorization for the use of force. This interpretation 
would substantially increase the authority of the executive branch at 
the expense of Congress. The Smith court failed to correctly apply 
either of the two critical elements of the modern political question 
doctrine: the textual commitment of an issue to a political branch and 
the lack of judicially manageable standards. Instead, while facially 
 
 229. Id. at 118. 
 230. Cf. Bobbitt, supra note 217, at 1372–74 (describing both this view and the opposing view 
that Congress cannot delegate the power to declare war under any circumstance).  
 231. See generally Reply, supra note 42 (foregoing any such argument). 
 232. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text. 
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relying on those factors, the court appears to have in fact relied on the 
same prudential concerns that the Supreme Court seemingly 
abandoned234 in its Nixon and Zivotofsky I decisions.235 
A. The War Powers Are Not “Textually Committed” Within the 
Meaning of Baker 
The Supreme Court has affirmed that courts may not hear cases 
“where there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
of the issue to a coordinate political department.’”236 However, the 
Court has not found that this prohibition precludes courts from hearing 
cases and controversies where both coordinate political branches, 
Congress and the executive, have overlapping authority.237 Instead, the 
Court found that “[t]he Judicial Branch appropriately exercises” the 
authority to determine the constitutionality of a statute “where the 
question is whether Congress or the Executive is ‘aggrandizing its 
power at the expense of another branch.’”238 
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o declare War.”239 
In filing suit, Smith expressly rested his claim on the argument that 
Congress had not declared war on ISIS.240 The Government did not 
argue that the power to declare war is textually committed to the 
executive branch, but it did argue that dismissal as a political question 
was appropriate because “[t]here is an explicit textual commitment of 
 
 234. See Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 202–05 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (criticizing the 
majority’s omission of the remaining Baker factors, and arguing that the “inquiry required by the 
political question doctrine . . . [is] more demanding than that suggested by the Court”). 
 235. Compare id. at 196 (majority opinion) (finding dismissal “merely ‘because the issues have 
political implications’” inappropriate under the political question doctrine (quoting INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983))), with Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 300 (D.D.C. 2016), 
order vacated, appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(finding a political question because the question was “committed to the political branches,” and 
because the court was not “well-equipped to resolve” the factual questions presented (emphasis 
added)). Other courts have also continued to apply the Baker “prudential factors” after 
Zivotofsky I. See Loomis, supra note 91 (criticizing these courts).  
 236. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 195 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)). 
 237. See id. (recognizing that courts would be correct to find a political question where the 
challenged rule is a judgment “that ‘the Constitution leaves to the Executive alone’” (quoting 
Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1231–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009))); cf. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229 
(affirming dismissal as a political question where the language of the Constitution “indicates that 
this authority is reposed in the Senate and nowhere else”). 
 238. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 197 (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)). 
 239. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 240. See Complaint, supra note 37, ¶ 23 (“President Obama is fighting a war against ISIS 
without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization.”). 
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the war powers not to one of the political branches, but to both.”241 This 
argument must fail.  
There are two plausible interpretations of the Government’s 
argument. One version would preclude courts from reviewing political 
decisions by the executive and Congress only where both branches are 
textually allocated authority under the Constitution, as is the case for 
the war powers. However, in other policy areas where control is 
constitutionally divided between the political branches, the courts do 
have authority to review executive actions. For example, the President 
has the authority to make recess appointments without Senate 
approval,242 while the Senate has the authority to “determine the Rules 
of its Proceedings.”243 The Supreme Court found that the Senate’s 
authority to establish its own rules includes the authority to decide 
whether it is in recess at any given time; the Court also held that courts 
are competent to determine whether the facts on the ground meet the 
standard set out in those Senate rules.244 Based on a finding that the 
Senate was in fact not in recess, the Court found that the President’s 
attempt to make a recess appointment had exceeded his authority; the 
Court thus blocked his appointment.245   
Alternatively, the Government’s argument in Smith could stand 
for the proposition that only the war powers are allocated between the 
political branches in such a way that precludes judicial consideration. 
This proposition does have some support from lower court decisions.246 
However, reading these cases to support such a proposition overstates 
 
 241. Reply, supra note 42, at 7 (alteration in original) (quoting Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 
509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990)). 
 242. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies 
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate . . . .”). 
 243. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 244. See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574–75 (2014) (“[W]e must give great weight to 
the Senate’s own determination of when it is and when it is not in session. But our deference to 
the Senate cannot be absolute.”). 
 245. Id. at 2574 (finding that the Senate has the authority to determine that it is not in recess 
and to block appointments under the Recess Appointments Clause). 
 246. See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 142 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that the Constitution 
“envisages the joint participation of the Congress and the executive in determining the scale and 
duration of hostilities” (quoting Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 31–32 (1st Cir. 1971) 
(emphasis added))); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“If Congress doubts or disagrees with the Executive’s determination that 
[military action is consistent with the WPR], it has the resources to investigate the matter and 
assert its wishes.”). 
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the strength of the Government’s position.247 Put simply, it proves far 
too much. Courts throughout the nation’s history have grappled with 
the question whether a specific military action falls within the grant of 
authority from Congress to the executive in a given instance.248 In many 
instances, courts have reached the merits of the question and found 
that Congress had, in fact, granted the executive the authority it was 
exercising.249 If these decisions are legitimate interpretations of the 
relevant statutes, then it follows that courts could properly find that the 
executive had overstepped its authority on different facts. 
In any event, the Smith court did not expressly commit to either 
interpretation of the Government’s approach to determining what 
constitutes textual commitment for the purpose of the political 
question doctrine.250 Instead, the court emphasized the broad 
discretion Congress granted the President in carrying out both the 2001 
and 2002 AUMFs by granting the authority to use any force that the 
President determines to be “necessary and appropriate.”251 The court 
suggested that absent the infringement of a statutory right like in 
Zivotofsky I, courts are not competent to second-guess the executive’s 
determination of the appropriate level of force.252 That is likely true, 
but it mischaracterizes the question the court was asked—not how the 
 
 247. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(noting that “[e]ven in the context of military action, the courts may sometimes have a role”); see 
also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – 
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 723 (2008) 
(“If there is a party with constitutionally sufficient standing to demand judicial protection from a 
presidential refusal to obey a statute during war, it is not clear why there should be a general rule 
that courts must leave the question to the political branches.”). 
 248. See supra Part II.B. 
 249. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d at 34 (finding that parsing of the allocation of 
war powers between Congress and the executive was unnecessary where Congress had 
appropriated significant funds to the Vietnam War because that appropriation was sufficient to 
find “a prolonged period of [c]ongressional support of executive activities”); Orlando v. Laird, 
443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that congressional enactments supporting the Vietnam 
War satisfied the requirement for congressional support that is implied in the Constitution). 
 250. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 298–300 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal 
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (discussing textual 
commitment under the first Baker factor). 
 251. Id. at 300 (first quoting 2002 AUMF § 3(a)(1); then quoting 2001 AUMF § 2(a)). 
 252. See id. at 299 (distinguishing lawsuits to “enforce a specific statutory right” from lawsuits 
asking “the Court to second-guess the Executive’s application of these statutes to specific facts on 
the ground”). 
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President should prosecute a war against ISIS, but whether Congress 
had authorized the President to prosecute a war against ISIS at all.253  
As an absurd example, the court would presumably have rejected 
an argument that the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs authorized the President 
to use military force against a Venezuelan terrorist organization, 
reasoning that neither statute specifies the group as a legitimate target. 
While ISIS presents a much closer question, the court failed to address 
the claim despite its legal obligation to do so. As the D.C. Circuit 
implied in El-Shifa, the political question doctrine does not preclude 
consideration of “claims ‘[p]resenting purely legal issues’ such as 
whether the government had legal authority to act,” even when those 
cases implicate military action.254 The Smith court conflated that 
question—whether the statute provided the requisite authority to 
prosecute a military campaign—with the question of the wisdom of the 
campaign.255 The latter is a political question under current doctrine; 
the former is not. 
B. Cases like Smith Present Judicially Manageable Standards 
The Smith court also noted that “the Court can easily discern that 
this case raises factual questions that are not of a type the Court is 
equipped to handle with traditional judicially manageable 
standards.”256 The court identified one such question as whether ISIS 
continued to owe some degree of allegiance to al Qaeda.257 This 
approach was, at a minimum, inconsistent with the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding in Parhat that the evidence presented by the Government in a 
military tribunal was “insufficient to categorize [the plaintiff] as an 
 
 253. See Complaint, supra note 37, ¶¶ 17–19 (noting that the executive did not provide a legal 
explanation for whether a war against ISIS is consistent with the WPR). 
 254. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (alteration 
in original) (quoting Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (affirming dismissal 
where the action challenged the wisdom of military action abroad). 
 255. Compare Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 299–300 (characterizing the question before 
the court as seeking “to determine whether the President is correct that the ongoing military 
action against ISIL is in fact ‘necessary and appropriate’” within the meaning of the statute 
(quoting 2002 AUMF § 3(a)(1))), with El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 842 (“[W]e have distinguished 
between claims requiring us to decide whether taking military action was ‘wise’—‘a “. . . 
determination[] constitutionally committed for resolution to . . . Congress or . . . the Executive 
Branch”’—and claims ‘[p]resenting purely legal issues’ such as whether the government had legal 
authority to act.” (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Campbell, 203 F.3d 
at 40)).  
 256. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 300. 
 257. See id. (noting disagreement among the parties on this question).  
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enemy combatant under [the Department of Defense]’s definition.”258 
The Smith court did not note, but might have, the reluctance of some 
courts to provide an answer to the question whether a state of war 
exists given a particular set of facts.259 The court should have found that 
it could answer both questions via “careful examination of the textual, 
structural, and historical evidence put forward by the parties regarding 
the nature of the statute” and the governmental powers at issue.260 
The first and most basic question the Smith court should have 
addressed is the existence vel non of a state of war between the United 
States and ISIS. In Crockett v. Reagan,261 the same court found that the 
question whether the facts on the ground constituted a state of war was 
nonjusticiable.262 However, that ruling was predicated on facts that are 
easily distinguished from the instant case. First, in Crockett, the 
Government did not even concede the existence of hostilities.263 In fact, 
the plaintiffs’ assertions that the U.S. military forces in El Salvador 
were in combat were specifically contested by the Government.264 
Second, the scale of the conflict involved, even on the plaintiffs’ 
account, was negligible compared to the ongoing campaign against 
ISIS.265 The Government’s briefs in Smith described the scope of the 
operation in some depth and asserted that the President had authority 
to conduct military operations against ISIS under both the 2001 and 
2002 AUMFs.266 The Government even cited its notification of the 
appropriate congressional committees in accordance with the WPR as 
 
 258. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 259. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982) (finding that two news 
articles referencing U.S. forces engaged in hostilities in El Salvador were not sufficient grounds 
to find that a state of war existed, and finding that the case should be dismissed as a political 
question that lacked manageable standards) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).  
 260. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012). 
 261. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982). 
 262. See id. at 896 (“[T]he cause of action under the [WPR] . . . is non-justiciable because of 
the nature of the factfinding that would be required . . . .”). 
 263. See id. at 896–97 (noting the Government’s assertion that U.S. military forces were not 
involved in hostilities in El Salvador). 
 264. See id. at 897–98 (comparing the Government and the plaintiff’s characterizations of the 
U.S. military’s involvement in El Salvador).  
 265. Compare id. at 897 (noting that the plaintiffs based their suit on unsubstantiated reports 
that the Department of Defense authorized hostile-fire pay to troops serving in El Salvador and 
on a lone newspaper report of “U.S. Armed Forces . . . ‘fighting side by side’ with government 
troops”), with Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 285–86 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal 
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (describing the scope 
of OIR). 
 266. E.g., Gov’t Mem. of Law, supra note 48, at 3–8.  
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well as congressional authorizations and appropriations covering fiscal 
years 2015 and 2016 as additional evidence of congressional support for 
the campaign.267 Given these facts—which were included in the 
pleadings—and given the inherent authority of the court to find facts 
by judicial notice,268 the Smith court could and should have found that 
a state of war existed for the purpose of the suit.269 
The second question the Smith court was asked to address is 
whether ISIS was a permissible target of war under either a statute or 
the Constitution.270 The court specifically found that that inquiry 
presented a political question because “[r]esolving this dispute would 
require inquiries into sensitive military determinations, presumably 
made based on intelligence collected on the ground in a live theatre of 
combat, and potentially changing and developing on an ongoing 
basis.”271 This argument is unpersuasive on two grounds. 
First, in Parhat, the D.C. Circuit implied that courts are competent 
to determine whether a particular terrorist organization is an 
“associated force” within the meaning of a standard derived from the 
2001 AUMF.272 The court relied largely on classified sources gathered 
from U.S. intelligence agencies in concluding that the available 
evidence did not support an “associated force” determination; 
ultimately, the court reversed a military commission’s designation of a 
Chinese national as an enemy combatant.273 The D.C. Circuit returned 
to the same question in Al-Bihani v. Obama,274 and this time it upheld 
 
 267. See id. at 9–15 (describing congressional appropriations and authorizations for fiscal 
years 2015 and 2016).  
 268. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE § 5106 (2d ed.) (noting that “Rule 201(b)(2) permits judicial notice of 
‘ascertainable facts’”). 
 269. See, e.g., Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that courts 
are able to ascertain the existence of war by using “reason and judgment”). 
 270. See Complaint, supra note 37, ¶¶ 31–41 (arguing that the campaign was not supported 
by either statutory or constitutional authority). 
 271. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 300 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal dismissed 
as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 272. See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 844, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that the evidence 
presented was insufficient to show that the detainee was a member of an “associated force,” and 
ordering the government to either release him or conduct a new hearing to determine whether a 
member of a terrorist organization alleged to be essentially part of al Qaeda falls within the scope 
of the 2001 AUMF).  
 273. See id. at 837, 844, 854.  
 274. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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the detention for trial under the Military Commissions Act275 of a 
Yemeni citizen who was captured while fighting as part of a brigade of 
foreign fighters aligned with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.276 The 
court specifically noted that “the facts show [Al-Bihani’s group] . . . was 
affiliated with Al Qaeda and Taliban forces and engaged in hostilities 
against a U.S. Coalition partner”; consequently, Al-Bihani “falls 
squarely within the scope” of the President’s authority under the 
statute.277  
The challenge in Al-Bihani was to government detention, rather 
than to the use of military force alone, and the statute in question was 
the Military Commissions Act, rather than the 2001 AUMF alone.278 
However, the issues raised in Al-Bihani are analogous to the questions 
presented in Smith. While the courts have proven more willing to 
challenge executive actions in the detention context than other forms 
of military action,279 the Al-Bihani court necessarily found that, in 
isolation, the question whether a particular force is an “associated 
force” of al Qaeda and the Taliban is not beyond the competence of 
the court to answer.280  
Second, the Government proposed a workable standard in Smith. 
The Al-Bihani court noted that the 2006 Military Commissions Act 
“provided guidance on the class of persons subject to detention under 
the AUMF.”281 However, the lack of a statutory definition of 
associated forces in either AUMF is not dispositive. As the 
Government noted in its brief to the Smith court, the National Defense 
 
 275. Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in part at 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)). 
 276. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872–73 (finding that evidence of the activities of the 
defendant’s military unit with regard to the Taliban was sufficient to establish that he was a 
member of an “associated force” within the meaning of the statute). 
 277. Id. at 873. 
 278. Id. at 869–72. Al-Bihani was detained pursuant to military action taken under the 2001 
AUMF, so that statute is also discussed in the case. 
 279. Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528, 538 (2004) (finding that the petitioner’s 
due process rights were violated because “the most elemental of liberty interests”—freedom from 
government detention—was implicated), with Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 247 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (contrasting, explicitly, the need for deference to military planners in selecting targets for 
drone strikes with the need to provide judicial review in detention cases), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
480 (2017). 
 280. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 (finding that an organization that “supported” al Qaeda 
and that was “aided” or “commanded” by al Qaeda members falls within the statute (quoting 
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 33, Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d 866 (No. 09-5051))). 
 281. Id. at 872. 
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012282—which was enacted prior to 
any of the events at issue in the case—affirms the President’s authority 
under the 2001 AUMF to detain individuals who are “part of or 
substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces.”283 
Congress’s use of the word “affirmation” to describe the President’s 
powers to detain members of associated forces under the AUMF 
implies that Congress understood the President to already have the 
authority to target those individuals and groups under the existing 
statutory framework.284 To meet that associated-force requirement, the 
Government in Smith presented evidence intended to show that ISIS 
satisfied both prongs of the two-part test articulated by Johnson and 
Preston;285 namely, ISIS was “an organized, armed group that has 
entered the fight alongside al Qaeda and . . . is a cobelligerent with al 
Qaeda in hostilities against the United States.”286 The Smith court 
could have found that the evidence presented, including classified 
evidence, was insufficient or unresponsive to the question. It did 
neither.  
C. The Smith Court’s Reliance on the Political Question Doctrine 
Was Both Misleading and Unnecessary 
As the Baker Court noted, the political question doctrine provides 
a judicial tool for analyzing separation of powers problems.287 In 
describing the alleged constitutional violation at issue, Smith expressly 
described President Obama’s campaign against ISIS as “misusing 
limited congressional authorization for the use of military force as a 
blank check to conduct a war against enemies of his own choosing.”288 
On its own terms, the question raised by this allegation could not be 
 
 282. See Gov’t Mem. of Law, supra note 48, at 6 (quoting Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514 
(D.D.C. 1990)) (citing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 as 
demonstrating congressional intent that the 2001 AUMF covers ISIS). 
 283. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(b), 
125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). 
 284. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RES. SERV., R42143, 
WARTIME DETENTION PROVISIONS IN RECENT DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION 8 
(2016) (noting that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 was intended to 
codify existing authority under the 2001 AUMF, as interpreted by the D.C. Circuit).  
 285. Gov’t Mem. of Law, supra note 48, at 8–17. 
 286. Id. at 5–8; Johnson, supra note 33. 
 287. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question 
is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). 
 288. See Complaint, supra note 37, at ¶ 8. 
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answered without reference to the statute.289 The Smith court, while 
claiming to be incapable of deciding the case because of the political 
question doctrine, nevertheless dedicated the entire latter third of its 
opinion to actually addressing separation of powers questions. The 
court followed Youngstown—the dominant paradigm for separation of 
powers questions—closely analyzing the nature of the power exercised 
and the underlying congressional authorization.290  
Moreover, the Smith court did reach the merits on the question 
whether Congress had approved military action against ISIS, finding 
that “the Court in this case is not presented with a dispute between the 
two political branches regarding the challenged action.”291 The court 
devoted nearly half of its discussion of the political question doctrine 
to the apparent agreement between the executive and Congress on this 
matter.292 The court cited a string of cases to support the uncontested 
proposition that “judicial intervention into military affairs is 
particularly inappropriate when the two political branches to whom 
war-making powers are committed are not in dispute as to the military 
action at issue.”293 In making that statement, the court answered the 
very question which it said it was incapable of determining: Had 
Congress passed legislation under which the executive could take 
lawful military action against ISIS?  
In a footnote, the court offered one hint at a possible reason why 
it did not reach the merits of the case; it noted that it declined to 
address the question whether the subsequent authorizations and 
appropriations constituted a sufficient statutory basis in order to avoid 
addressing the constitutionality of section 8(a) of the WPR.294 Such 
 
 289. While the Obama administration publicly argued that the executive possesses sufficient 
exclusive authority under Article II to prosecute the campaign against ISIS, see, e.g., Sept. 2014 
Presidential Address, supra note 29 (stating that the President has sufficient authority to wage 
war against ISIS, but nevertheless stating “I believe we are strongest as a nation when the 
President and Congress work together”), the Government did not raise this argument explicitly 
in its Smith filings. 
 290. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 297–303 (D.D.C. 2016), order vacated, appeal 
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (analyzing the 
President’s decision to conduct the campaign in light of steady congressional support); see also 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(analyzing the executive action in light of the existing statutory scheme and finding no 
congressional support); Barron & Lederman, supra note 247, at 701 (describing Justice Jackson’s 
three-part analysis as “the conventional post-Youngstown orientation”). 
 291. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 301. 
 292. Id. at 301–03. 
 293. Id. at 302. 
 294. Id. at 302 n.15. 
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hesitation is neither surprising295 nor necessarily improper.296 However, 
in extending the political question to cover a challenge to the authority 
of the executive to wage war on targets of its choosing, the court 
brought into question the meaning of the Constitution itself, rather 
than that of a mere statute. 
The Government in Smith did not claim that it has inherent 
constitutional authority to initiate a war without congressional 
approval,297 and the court did not explicitly make any such finding.298 
However, by dismissing the case as a political question, the court 
implied that the subject matter falls entirely within the purview of the 
executive branch.299 In an apparent effort to avoid deciding the 
constitutionality of a statutory provision, section 8(a) of the WPR, the 
court instead cast doubt on the constitutional authority of Congress to 
constrain the executive under its war-powers authority. If every finding 
of a political question is, in effect, a victory on the merits for the 
executive branch vis-a-vis Congress,300 then the court’s decision in 
Smith was a significant advancement of the proposition that whatever 
authority Congress may have under the Declare War Clause is never 
judicially enforceable. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Smith court’s expansive reading of the political question 
doctrine was overbroad, but it represents the logical culmination of 
 
 295. Compare Carter, supra note 170 (arguing that the WPR is constitutional), with ROBERT 
F. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
107–33 (1983) (arguing that the WPR is likely unconstitutional). 
 296. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of Congress 
is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal 
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible 
by which the question may be avoided.”). But see Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 395 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that in some instances, the avoidance doctrine decides, rather 
than avoids, constitutional questions). 
 297. See Reply, supra note 42, at 2 (noting that “this case would require answering questions 
that are ‘textually committed’ for resolution to the political branches” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 217 (1962))). 
 298. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 298 (basing dismissal on the political question 
doctrine—specifically on the textual commitment of “foreign policy and national security” to “the 
political branches”). 
 299. Cf. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. 189, 195–96 (2012) (finding that the lower courts erred in 
dismissing the challenges as political questions because they implicated a private statutory right). 
 300. See Louis M. Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 477 (2004) (arguing that decisions reached under the political question 
doctrine can be understood as decisions on the underlying merits of the case).  
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increasing deference to the executive on matters of national security; 
the unique nature of the United States’ adversaries under the 2001 
AUMF as compared to previous conflicts; and Congress’s lack of 
oversight beyond annual authorizations and appropriations legislation. 
This Part recommends solutions for each of those issues. 
First, federal courts should take Zivotofsky I at its word when they 
are asked to differentiate between the statutory basis for and the 
wisdom of government action, instead of “treat[ing] the two questions 
as one and the same.”301 It is relatively easy to use such a formulation 
when the court finds that a lawsuit challenges the wisdom of 
government action; such a suit is a political question both in the sense 
that it challenges an action that was subject to the discretion of actors 
within one political branch and in the sense that a court could not use 
judicially manageable standards without substituting its own judgment 
for that of the political-branch actors.302 In such cases, dismissal as a 
political question is appropriate. 
Second, the nature of suits challenging military action abroad are 
such that there will often be other grounds on which dismissal is 
appropriate; courts have dismissed similar actions on grounds of 
standing,303 ripeness,304 and redressability.305 In fact, some 
commentators have gone so far as to argue that standing jurisprudence 
has subsumed the political question doctrine entirely.306 These 
justiciability tools may be particularly useful where a court wishes to 
avoid enjoining the President from carrying out an ongoing military 
campaign, as in Smith. Because the political question doctrine 
implicates the constitutional separation of powers,307 courts can and 
should dismiss suits on other grounds before reaching the political 
 
 301. John R. Crook, U.S. Supreme Court Rules Statute Directing State Department to Record 
Jerusalem-Born Citizen’s Birthplace as “Israel” Does Not Raise Political Question, Contemporary 
Practices of the United States Relating to International Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 644, 645 (2012); 
see also, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(differentiating between challenges to the wisdom of government action and to the legal basis for 
that action).  
 302. See El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 842–43 (identifying challenges to the “prudence of the political 
branches” as unavoidably political questions). 
 303. Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 289. 
 304. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1152 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 305. N.J. Peace Action v. Obama, No. 08-2315, 2009 WL 1416041, at *5 (D.N.J. May 19, 2009). 
 306. E.g., Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Along: Do We Still Need The Political Question 
Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303, 333 (1996). 
 307. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–11 (1962) (explaining that the nonjusticiability of 
political questions stems from the separation of powers). 
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question doctrine and creating a sweeping precedent where a narrow 
decision could have reached the same, correct result.308 
Once a court has reached the merits of the legality of military 
action, the critical question becomes the formulation of judicially 
manageable standards by which to adjudicate the case. Two 
alternatives present themselves: develop a set of standards de novo or 
adapt standards developed by the parties. While there may be some 
cases where judges determine that they are competent to develop 
manageable standards absent input from the parties,309 in cases 
implicating national security and military action, it seems more likely 
that judges will rely on the parties (and particularly the Government) 
to provide suggestions.310 As Justice Souter reasoned in Nixon, courts 
could always retain the flexibility to reject proposed standards in the 
event that the Government proposes or employs a sufficiently arbitrary 
standard.311  
This is not to suggest that the questions presented in this context 
will be simple ones. To take Smith as an example, courts might be asked 
to consider questions such as whether a given set of facts is sufficient 
to find that “war” exists; the meaning of a statute authorizing force 
against a given set of actors; whether an organization falls within that 
set of permissible targets under the statute; and whether the executive 
has an independent constitutional authority to take the challenged 
action. However, courts have already devised standards to answer each 
 
 308. As Justice Brandeis explained: 
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although properly presented by 
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be 
disposed of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided upon two grounds, one involving a 
constitutional question, the other involving a question of statutory construction or 
general law, the Court will decide only the latter. 
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 309. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 225, 253–54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that arbitrary procedures for impeachment cases might justify judicial intervention, 
despite textual commitment of the matter to Congress). 
 310. See, e.g., Parhat v. Gates, 532 U.S. 822, 837–38 (2008) (adopting the Government’s 
standards for determining whether an alleged terrorist group was an “associated force” of al 
Qaeda). The Government did reference the “associated forces” framework in its brief to the 
Smith court, but it did not develop that legal framework to the same degree seen in 
contemporaneous public statements by administration officials. Compare Gov’t Mem. of Law, 
supra note 48, at 30–31 (arguing that courts lack the capacity to determine whether an individual 
or group falls within the ambit of the 2001 or 2002 AUMFs), with Preston, supra note 16 
(articulating one set of possible standards). 
 311. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 253–54 (arguing against accepting arbitrary and capricious 
standards, even given clear textual commitment). 
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of those questions.312 The fact that questions require careful analysis, 
hinge on access to classified information, or seem politically sensitive 
does not preclude their consideration. 
Finally, courts should apply the same principles of statutory 
interpretation and canons of construction to questions implicating the 
WPR that they would apply to other statutes. Specifically, in asking 
whether a statute has authorized the use of military force, courts should 
weigh the WPR’s section 8(a) prohibition on using appropriations 
absent an explicit grant of authority, on the one hand, against a reading 
of the statute that would, on the other hand, give full effect to all the 
WPR’s provisions.313 Reading section 8(a) as an absolute bar would 
unconstitutionally restrict the ability of future Congresses to conduct 
foreign affairs under the principle that one Congress cannot bind a 
future Congress.314 However, courts should keep the language of 
section 8(a) in mind, considering that Congress enacts all subsequent 
legislation against the background principle that absent clear statutory 
language, laws do not authorize the President to conduct a war. 
This approach would be consistent with longstanding principles of 
statutory interpretation: “[R]epeals by implication are not favored . . . 
and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is clear and manifest.”315 
The 2001 AUMF both reiterates and satisfies the WPR’s clear-
statement requirement.316 Congress continues to legislate as if the 
WPR is good law.317 Finally, to the constitutional question, even if the 
 
 312. See Parhat, 532 U.S. at 837–38 (finding that the group to which the defendant belonged 
was not an authorized target under the statute); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 640–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (finding that the President did not have 
independent constitutional authority to take the challenged executive action); Brig Amy 
Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862) (finding the de facto existence of war); Bas v. Tingy, 
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (inferring from a statute’s use of the word “enemy” that it permitted 
military action against French targets). 
 313. See 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (stating that appropriations legislation shall not provide the 
legal basis for military action unless otherwise explicitly authorized).  
 314. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (establishing this principle). 
 315. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987). 
 316. 2001 AUMF § 2(b) (“Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the 
Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within 
the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.”). 
 317. See, e.g., Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1236, 128 Stat. 3292, 3560 (2014) (“Nothing in 
this section shall be construed to constitute a specific statutory authorization for the introduction 
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein hostilities are clearly 
indicated by the circumstances.”). 
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WPR is not binding on Congress, it may still be binding on the courts 
that interpret Congress’s enactments.318 
CONCLUSION 
The political question doctrine is an important tool to avoid 
entangling the judiciary in matters over which the courts properly have 
no jurisdiction. However, given the realities of a presidential system, 
an overly broad reading of the doctrine risks giving the executive 
unfettered control over areas of policy that are properly shared 
between Congress and the President under the Constitution. Since the 
Vietnam War era, courts have increasingly used the political question 
doctrine to avoid reaching critical questions of foreign and military 
policy; that invocation of the doctrine rests on uneasy constitutional 
footing. The interpretation of the political question doctrine embraced 
by the Smith court represents a dramatic expansion of executive power 
that should be repudiated. 
 
 318. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (noting that a court “must read [allegedly 
conflicting] statutes to give effect to each if [it] can while preserving their sense and purpose”). 
